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Abstract 
This study contributes to the literature on supply-side adjustments to insurance expansions by 
examining the effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on ambulance response times.  
Exploiting temporal and geographic variation in the implementation of the ACA as well as pre-
treatment differences in uninsured rates, we estimate that the expansions of private and Medicaid 
coverage under the ACA combined to slow ambulance response times by an average of 19%.  
We conclude that, through extending coverage to individuals who, in its absence, would not have 
availed themselves of emergency medical services, the ACA added strain to emergency response 
systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Ever since the publication of Arrow’s (1963) seminal article, economists have explored 
and deliberated the appropriate role of government in health insurance markets.  With the 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 and subsequent, high-
profile repeal efforts, this question has also risen to the forefront of public policy debates.  While 
the effects of health insurance expansions on utilization and other patient outcomes have been 
studied extensively, less attention has been paid to the supply-side of the market and whether 
provider capacity constraints create challenges as the demand for medical care increases.  The 
current study explores one of the potential supply-side challenges caused by expanding insurance 
coverage.  Specifically, our interest is in estimating the effect of the ACA on ambulance 
response time, defined as the time elapsed between notification and when the first ambulance 
arrived on the scene of a motor vehicle accident. 
 The ACA was intended to achieve nearly universal health insurance coverage through a 
combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and government subsidies.  In an effort to 
provide access to affordable coverage for patients with pre-existing conditions, insurers 
operating in the non-group insurance market were prohibited from denying or dropping 
coverage, pricing based on health (aside for limited adjustments for age and smoking status), 
setting lifetime caps, and offering sub-standard benefits.  Because these regulations on their own 
would likely have led to adverse selection, the ACA required that individuals obtain insurance 
coverage or pay a tax penalty.  The ACA also expanded Medicaid to 138% of the Federal 
Poverty Line (FPL), while providing subsidies for purchasing coverage through private insurance 
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“Marketplaces” (Gruber, 2011).1  A 2012 Supreme Court decision made the Medicaid expansion 
component of the ACA optional, and, as of May 2017, 19 states had opted out.   
A number of studies have documented a sharp increase in health insurance coverage in 
2014, the year in which the major components of the ACA took effect (Long et al., 2014; Smith 
and Medalia, 2015; Barnett and Vornovitsky, 2016; Courtemanche et al., 2016; McMorrow et 
al., 2016).  Using American Community Survey (ACS) data through 2014, Courtemanche et al. 
(2017a) found that the ACA increased health insurance coverage by 6 percentage points in states 
that expanded Medicaid and by 3 percentage points in the 19 non-expansion states.  Using an 
additional year of ACS data (i.e., 2015), Frean et al. (2017) concluded that the expansion of state 
Medicaid programs accounted for 60% of the coverage gains under the ACA, while the 
remaining 40% could be attributed to the subsidies offered through the private insurance 
exchanges.2 
 Expanding health insurance coverage should, in theory, increase the amount of medical 
care demanded by reducing its out-of-pocket price.  The extent to which this increase actually 
translates into health care utilization depends, however, on the supply-side response, which could 
be limited by barriers to entry such as licensing requirements, the capital costs of medical 
facilities and equipment, and the extensive regulations governing the construction of new 
medical facilities.  A substantial body of research has shown that the United States is currently 
experiencing acute shortages of health care providers, particularly in the primary care sector (Ku 
et al., 2009; Bodenheimer and Pham, 2010; Juraschek et al., 2012; Dall et al., 2017), and 
                                                 
1 The ACA also included many other components such as mandates for employers to provide coverage and for 
insurers to allow dependents to remain on parents’ plans until age 26, changes to Medicare financing, and tax 
increases on high-income individuals and medical devices.  The Kaiser Foundation has published a useful guide to 
the ACA (Kaiser Family Foundation 2017a).  
 
2 Other studies that have investigated the effects of the ACA on coverage include Kaestner et al. (2015) and Wherry 
and Miller (2016), both of which focused on the effect of expanding state Medicaid programs.  
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projections indicate that these shortages will be exacerbated as a result of the ACA (Ku et al., 
2009; Sargen et al., 2011; Huang and Finegold, 2013).  If health care providers cannot meet the 
additional demand for their services generated by expanding insurance coverage, both newly 
insured patients and patients who were previously covered might experience difficulty in 
accessing care, undermining the case for expansion (Hofer et al., 2011; Kirch et al., 2013; Miller 
and Wherry, 2017).  
Considerable evidence – dating back to the RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 
1970s and 1980s (Manning et al., 1987) – suggests that expanding health insurance coverage 
encourages utilization, consistent with the fact that coverage lowers the effective price of 
medical care.  This literature has explored the effects of several important policy interventions.  
In the United States alone, these interventions include Medicaid (Currie and Gruber, 1996a; 
Dafny and Gruber, 2005; Baicker et al., 2013; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Taubman et al., 2014; 
Tello-Trillo, 2016), Medicare (Lichtenberg, 2002; Card et al., 2008), the Massachusetts universal 
coverage initiative (Miller, 2012a; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Van der Wees et al., 2013), the 
2010 expansion of coverage to young adults under the ACA (Sommers et al., 2013; Antwi et al., 
2015; Barbaresco et al., 2015) and the various ACA provisions that took effect in 2014 
(Sommers et al., 2015; Courtemanche et al., 2017b; Simon et al., 2017; Miller and Wherry 
2017).  
Whether increased utilization actually results in better health outcomes of patients is, 
however, still an open question.  There is strong evidence that the expansion of private insurance 
coverage under the Massachusetts reform led to sizeable improvements in self-assessed health 
and reductions in emergency room use (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012b; Van der 
Wees et al., 2013; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014).  By contrast, despite improving self-
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assessed health, the randomized Oregon Medicaid expansion had little to no impact on clinically 
measured health outcomes, and actually led to an increase in emergency room utilization 
(Baicker et al., 2013; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Taubman et al., 2014).  The private insurance 
portion of the ACA seems to have improved access to care, but the evidence with regard to its 
effect on self-assessed health is decidedly mixed (Sommers et al., 2015; Courtemanche et al., 
2017b).  Several studies have found that the Medicaid expansion under the ACA led to modest 
access gains for patients, but had no discernable effect on self-assessed health (Sommers et al., 
2015; Courtemanche et al., 2017b; Simon et al., 2017).  
 Despite the potential importance of capacity constraints in explaining the heterogeneous 
effects of insurance coverage expansions described in the paragraph above, only a handful of 
previous studies have focused on the supply-side of the market.3  Garthwaite (2012) concluded 
that physicians responded to the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) by 
shortening office visits, while Kolstad and Kowalski’s results suggest that the 2006 
Massachusetts reform led to shorter hospital stays.  Kondo and Shigeoka (2013) found that 
hospitals increased their capacity (as measured by number of beds) after the introduction of 
universal health insurance in Japan, but there were no noteworthy changes in the numbers of 
medical institutions, physicians, or nurses.  Buchmueller et al. (2014) examined provider 
behavior and patient wait times before and after several states expanded their Medicaid programs 
to include dental benefits.  These authors found that the use of hygienists increased when 
                                                 
3 If providers are unable to fully meet new demand, they may give priority to more lucrative privately insured 
patients, potentially explaining the heterogeneous effects of insurance expansions.  Moreover, if capacity constraints 
are less binding in wealthy states, this could explain why the expansion of private insurance coverage under the 
Massachusetts reform led to sizeable improvements in self-assessed health and reductions in emergency room use, 
while the Oregon Medicaid expansion led to an increase in emergency room use (Courtemanche et al., 2017b). 
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coverage was expanded, but dentists also responded by increasing their own work effort.  
Nonetheless, wait times for patients rose “modestly” (Buchmueller et al., 2014, p. 3).4   
 We contribute to the small but growing literature on supply-side adjustments to insurance 
expansions by investigating the effect of the ACA on ambulance response times.  Our work 
provides the first estimates of the effect of coverage expansion under the ACA on wait times for 
any type of medical service.5  Moreover, although a literature exists on emergency room wait 
times and the practice of diverting ambulances to other hospitals in an effort to avoid 
overcrowding (e.g. Schull et al., 2003; Wilper et al., 2008), only one previous study, by David 
and Harrington (2010), has explored the determinants of ambulance response times, although 
these authors did not examine the effects of expanding insurance coverage.6  
Both Medicaid and Marketplace plans cover emergency medical services (Folger, 2015), 
and enrollment in a public insurance program was a strong predictor of using ambulance 
transport to the emergency room prior to the passage of the ACA (Rucker et al.,1997; Larkin et 
al., 2006).7  Evidence that the ACA led to an increase in the demand for emergency services 
                                                 
4 See also Friedson and Marier (2017), who described an influx of out-of-state physicians during the implementation 
of the Massachusetts reform, a solution to capacity limitations that is clearly less viable in the case of a nationwide 
reform such as the ACA.  Using data from National Health Interview Survey, Miller and Wherry (2017) examined 
the effect of Medicaid expansions under the ACA on various measures of access to care.  These authors found that 
low-income individuals living in expansion states were less likely to be shut out of care due to cost concerns, but 
were more likely to delay care because they could not make an appointment with a physician.   
 
5 Polsky et al. (2015) found evidence that the temporary increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate to primary care 
providers under the ACA shortened wait times for enrollees, but these authors did not study the effect of coverage 
expansions under the ACA.      
 
6 David and Harrington (2010) examined the influence of county demographics on ambulance response times.  See 
also David and Brachet (2011, p. 107), who examined the effect of “human capital accumulation” among EMS 
workers on out-of-hospital time, which is defined as the time between ambulance dispatch and the return to the 
hospital. 
 
7 The highest out-of-pocket payment for ambulance transport under Medicaid was $3.00 as of 2012.  The Kaiser 
Family Foundation keeps tables of Medicaid ambulance coverage by state (Kaiser Family Foundation 2017b).   
Under the ACA, all health insurance plans offered to individuals both through exchanges and employers are required 
to provide coverage for an Essential Health Benefits (EHB) package, which includes emergency ambulance services 
(Folger, 2015).   
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comes from New York City, where the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Authority assigns 
severity scores to patients.  Figure 1 shows counts of EMS dispatches in New York City 
stratified by severity score.8  The number of dispatches for patients whose severity score was 
above the 2013 median severity score held steady during the period 2013-2015.  By contrast, 
dispatches for patients whose score was below the 2013 median severity score increased by more 
than 50%, suggesting that the ACA incentivized patients with less severe injuries to call for 
emergency ambulance services. 
Additional evidence that the ACA led to an increase in the demand for emergency 
medical services comes from the National 911 Program (2014; 2015; 2016).  Twenty-three states 
provided 911 call volume data to the National 911 Program during the period 2013-2015.9  In 
2013, 136 million 911 calls were made in these 23 states.  By 2014, the year in which the ACA 
was fully implemented, the volume of 911 calls had increased to 143 million.  The volume of 
911 calls had increased to 148 million by 2015, an increase of almost 9% relative to 2013.   
If the demand for EMS services increased as a result of the ACA, there are several 
reasons to suspect that the supply-side response may have been muted, particularly in the short 
run.10  First, EMS personnel require considerable education and training, as well as certification, 
and there is evidence that shortages of these personnel existed even before the ACA took effect 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8 The data are available from NYC OpenData (2017a ).  Higher scores denote more severe emergencies. (Regional 
Emergency Medical Advisory Committee 2015). 
 
9 The remaining 27 states either did not report 911 call volume data to the National 911 Program or only reported 
these data for a subset of years.  
 
10 Under the ACA, all health insurance plans offered to individuals both through exchanges and employers are 
required to provide coverage for an Essential Health Benefits (EHB) package, which includes emergency ambulance 
services (Folger, 2015).  Emergency ambulance services are also covered by every state’s Medicaid program. 
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(Halpern, 2010).11  Second, new ambulances can cost between $100,000 and $200,000, 
representing a major investment for emergency medical service providers (Lindberg, 2011).  
Finally, relative to, for instance, primary care physicians or dentists, the capital-intensive nature 
of ambulance services makes meeting new demand through working longer hours more difficult, 
and shortening visits in an effort to accommodate more patients is not an option available to 
EMS providers.  Because of the ACA was fully implemented only recently, we cannot explore 
its long-run impact on ambulance response times.    
 We begin by revisiting the effect of the ACA on insurance coverage, which can be 
thought of as our first stage.  Following Courtemanche et al. (2017a), we draw upon ACS data 
and adopt an identification strategy that exploits temporal and geographic variation in the 
implementation of the ACA as well as pre-treatment differences in uninsured rates.  There are, 
however, two key differences between our analysis and that of Courtemanche et al. (2017a).  
First, we use pre-ACA insured rates at the county level rather than the core-based statistical area 
(CBSA) level.  Second, we add a second year (2015) of post-treatment data.  Not surprisingly, 
our results are quite similar to those of Courtemanche et al. (2017a).  We find that the ACA 
increased health insurance coverage by 5 percentage points in states that expanded Medicaid and 
by three percentage points in non-expansion states.  The effect of the ACA on insurance 
coverage appears to have been stronger in 2015 than it was in 2014. 
Next, we turn our attention to the impact of the ACA on ambulance response times using 
data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) for the period 2010-2015 and the same 
research design as was used to estimate the effects of the ACA on health insurance coverage.  
We find that the ambulance response times increased substantially with the implementation of 
the ACA.  Specifically, our preferred estimates suggest that the expansions of private and 
                                                 
11 Below, we test directly for changes in levels of EMS personnel in response to the implementation of the ACA. 
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Medicaid coverage under the ACA combined to slow ambulance response times by almost two 
minutes, or approximately 19 percent at the average uninsured rate.  Because we find no 
evidence that this increase can be explained by traffic congestion or local economic conditions, 
we conclude that, through extending coverage to individuals who would have otherwise not 
availed themselves of emergency medical services, the ACA led to a substantial increase in 
ambulance response times.  
 
2. THE ACA AND INSURANCE COVERAGE 
As noted in the introduction, several recent studies have examined the effect of the ACA 
on health insurance coverage (Courtemanche et al., 2017a; Courtemanche et al., 2017b; Frean et 
al., 2017).12  Our interest in re-visiting this effect is twofold.  First, we want to update the 
Courtemanche et al. (2017a) estimates using information from the 2015 wave of the ACS, to 
which these authors did not have access.  Second, and more importantly, we want to exploit pre-
ACA differences in uninsured rates at the county, as opposed to the PUMA or CBSA, level 
because there are typically multiple ambulance response zones within a particular PUMA or 
CBSA (Emergency Medical Services Authority of California, 2013; North Dakota Department of 
Health, 2009; Central Region EMS and Trauma Care Council 2017) and the county is the finest 
geographic unit available to researchers using the publicly available SAHIE data.13  The first-
                                                 
12 Courtemanche et al.’s (2017b) focus was on estimating the effects of the ACA on access, risky health behaviors 
such as drinking and smoking, and self-reported health.  Frean et al. (2017) examined the effect of the various ACA 
provisions (exchange premium subsidies, expanding Medicaid, and the individual mandate) on insurance coverage 
using ACS data for the period 2012-2015. 
 
13 Frean et al. (2017) used pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility rates at the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) level.  The 
United States contains 2,071 PUMAs, each of which has at least 100,000 people.  Courtemanche et al. (2017a) 
calculated pre-ACA uninsured rates at the core-based statistical area (CBSA) level, while Courtemanche et al. 
(2017b) divided states into 4 areas (urban, suburban, non-MSA, and unknown).  Eighty percent of PUMAs, “map 
into precisely one CBSA”, while the remainder map into two or more CBSAs (Courtemanche et al., 2017a, p. 183).  
State or local governments typically work with ambulance operators to create semi-exclusive response zones.  The 
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stage estimates, therefore, both motivate our subsequent analyses and add to the literature on the 
ACA and coverage. 
Specifically, we use county-level data on insurance coverage rates from 2010-2015 from 
the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) program to estimate the following 
difference-in-difference (DD) regression equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
         
(1)   Insuredcst = α0 + α1Postt + α2 (Postt x Medicaid Expansions) + θc + εcst, 
 
where the dependent variable, Insuredcst, is equal to the proportion of residents living in county c 
and state s who were covered by health insurance in year t, and Postt is an indicator equal to 1 in 
the years 2014 and 2015 (and equal to 0 otherwise).14  Although a few components of the ACA 
took effect in 2010 (most notably, the requirement that dependents be allowed to stay on their 
parents’ private insurance plans until the age of 26), the major components of the ACA came 
into effect on January 1, 2014.  Medicaid Expansions is an indicator equal to 1 if state s expanded 
its Medicaid program under the ACA, and equal to 0 if it did not.15  Because county fixed 
                                                                                                                                                             
size of these zones can vary, but are typically much smaller than a PUMA.  For example, the county of Los Angeles 
has over 30 ambulance response zones and the city of Los Angeles has 7 response zones, while nearby (and largely 
rural) Kern county has 11 ambulance response zones.  
 
14 The SAHIE insurance coverage estimates are based on ACS, which uses the 1% sample of Census respondents. 
Our sample is restricted to counties with a population of more than 10,000, ensuring that the estimated pre-treatment 
uninsured rate is based on at least 100 individuals in each county.  ACS respondents are asked if they are currently 
covered by “any of the following types of health insurance or health coverage plans”, where the choices include 
“insurance though a current or former employer or union,” “insurance purchased directly from an insurance 
company,” “Medicare,” “Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for those with 
low incomes or a disability,” “TRICARE or other military health care,” “VA (including those who have ever used or 
enrolled for VA health care),” “Indian Health Service,” and “any other type of health insurance or health coverage 
plan.”  Only those respondents who answered “no” to every type of insurance listed above are considered by the 
SAHIE program to have been uninsured.  For more information on how the SAHIE are calculated see Bauder, Luery 
and Szelepka (2017).   
 
15 Twenty-four states and Washington D.C. expanded their Medicaid programs on January 1, 2014.  Seven states 
expanded their Medicaid programs after this date.  When interacted with Medicaid Expansions, the 
variable Postt was coded as 1 if a state expanded their Medicaid program at any point during year t.  We 
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effects, θc, are included, the Medicaid expansion indicator does not appear on the right-hand side 
of equation (1) except when interacted with Postt.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at 
the state level and all county-year level regressions are weighted by county population in the 
2010 census. 
 Estimates of equation (1) are reported in the first column of Table 1.  Taken at face value, 
they suggest that full implementation of the ACA led to a 5.7 percentage point increase in 
coverage, while coverage went up by 4.3 percentage points in non-expansion states.  However, 
as noted by Courtemanche et al. (2017a, p. 187), estimates of α1 and α2 are suspect both because 
insurance rates tend to fluctuate over time and because the decision to expand Medicaid 
expansion could have been correlated with the unobserved determinants of these fluctuations.    
 Given these issues, we report estimates of the following equation in the second column of 
Table 1: 
 
(2)   Insuredcst = β0 + β1 (Postt x Uninsured2013c) + β2 (Postt x Uninsured2013c x Medicaid 
 Expansions) + θc + γst + εcst, 
 
where Uninsured2013c is equal to the proportion of residents living in county c who had 
coverage in 2013 and state-by-year fixed effects, 𝛾𝑠𝑡, account for shocks to coverage at the state-
year level.16  Equation (2) is analogous to a standard difference-in-differences-in differences 
(DDD) equation, but instead of using an untreated control group, the effect of treatment (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                             
experimented with coding Postt as fraction of the expansion year (for example coding Michigan, which expanded on 
April 1, 2014 as .75 in 2014 and 1 in 2015).  The results were essentially unchanged from those reported in Tables 
1-9.    
 
16 Because state-by-year and county fixed effects are included, the variables Postt and Uninsured2013c do not appear 
on the right-hand side of equation (2) except when interacted with each other. 
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Medicaid expansion and the opening of the private insurance exchanges) depends upon the pre-
ACA uninsured rate in county c.17  Specifically, the effect of the ACA in non-expansion states is 
given by 𝛽1 x Uninsured2013c, while the effect of the ACA in expansion states is given by (𝛽1 + 
𝛽2)Uninsured2013c.  These effects are calculated at the mean of the pre-ACA uninsured rate, 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013𝑐 , or 0.179.   
 Estimates of equation (2) confirm that the ACA had a strong positive effect on coverage: 
the estimates of β1 and β2 are positive and significant at conventional levels.  At the mean of 
Uninsured2013c, we calculate that non-expansion states experienced an increase of three 
percentage points in their rate of coverage, while expansion states experienced an increase of 5 
percentage points; expanding Medicaid without implementing the other major components of the 
ACA is associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase in coverage.   
 In Table 2, we explore whether the effect of the ACA on insurance coverage rates 
changed between 2014 and 2015.  Specifically, we report estimates of a modified equation (2), in 
which the variable Postt is split into two separate indicators, one for 2014 and the other for 2015.   
Consistent with the results of Frean et al. (2017), we find evidence that the effect of ACA on 
insurance coverage grew over time.  We calculate that, at the mean of Uninsured2013c, non-
expansion states experienced a 3.7 percentage point increase in their rate of coverage by 2015, 
while states that did expand their Medicaid program under the ACA experienced a 6.3 
percentage point increase.  These estimates are significantly larger than the estimates for 2014, 
the year in which the ACA took effect.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Several previous studies have used a similar estimation strategy to examine the effects insurance expansions and 
contractions.   A non-exhaustive list of examples includes: Finklestein and McKnight (2008), Miller (2012b), 
Mazumder and Miller (forthcoming), Tello-Trillo (2017), and Courtemanche et al. (2017a). 
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3. THE ACA AND AMBULANCE RESPONSE TIMES 
 Having established the effect of the ACA on coverage, we now turn our attention to the 
effect of the ACA on ambulance response times.  Our data come from FARS and cover the 
period 2010-2015.  Collected by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the FARS 
data represent an annual census of fatal injuries suffered in motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) in the 
United States.18  Although insurance coverage clearly increased during the period under study, 
EMS providers may not have had enough time or money to increase capacity.  Thus, the 
estimates discussed below should be thought of as short-run.  In the long-run, providers could, in 
theory, respond to increased demand by employing more EMS workers and ambulances.   
Detailed accident-level information is available in FARS, including the hour and minute 
an accident occurred, the hour and minute EMS was notified, the hour and minute the first 
ambulance arrived at the scene, and the hour and minute the first ambulance arrived at the 
hospital.19  However, notification and/or arrival times are missing for approximately 45% of the 
MVCs in FARS during the period under study.  In Appendix Table A1, we test for whether the 
implementation of the ACA was associated with the probability that these times were missing 
using a DDD-style strategy similar to equation (2).  This exercise produced estimated 
coefficients that are, without exception, small and statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels, suggesting that selection is not an issue.   
                                                 
18 An accident is included in the FARS data if someone involved died within 30 days for reasons attributed to the 
accident (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2016). 
 
19 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration obtains information on fatal vehicular accidents from a 
variety of sources, including police crash reports, vehicle registration files, state highway department data, 
emergency medical services records, police reports, toxicology reports, and death certificates.  Ambulance response 
times are measured as the difference between when an EMS provider was notified and the time of arrival at the 
scene of the accident.  FARS also includes information on when the ambulance returned to the hospital after the 
accident. 
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If the implementation of the ACA did in fact lead to longer ambulance response times, 
the results of several medical studies provide evidence that this phenomenon would have 
decreased the odds of survival for MVC victims.  For instance, Gonzalez et al. (2009) analyzed 
data on MVCs and patient outcomes in Alabama for the period 2001-2002.  These authors found 
little evidence of a relationship between ambulance response times and the likelihood of survival 
in urban areas, but in rural areas this relationship was negative and significant.20  Durkin et al. 
(2005), Zwerling et al. (2005), and Li et al. (2008), and Sánchez-Mangas et al. (2010) provide 
additional evidence of a negative relationship between ambulance response times and the odds of 
surviving a MVC, especially in rural settings where ambulance response times tend to be longer.  
To explore the effect of the ACA on ambulance response times, we begin by estimating a 
DD equation of the following form: 
 
(3)   Response Timeacst = α0 + α1Postt + α2 (Postt x Medicaid Expansions) + 𝜶3
′ Xacst+ θc + εacst, 
 
where the dependent variable is the time (in minutes) that elapsed between when the EMS 
provider was notified and when the ambulance first arrived on the scene of fatal accident a, in 
county c, state s, and year t.21  Because the unit of observation is now the fatal accident, we are 
able to add a vector of accident-specific controls.  This vector,  𝑿𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑡, includes indicators for 
                                                 
20 Gonzalez et al. (2009, p. 34) concluded that “protracted scene times” in rural, but not urban, areas may “contribute 
to increased mortality.”  
 
21 The response time is top-coded at 180 minutes, but the results discussed below are robust to the including the 15 
accidents with response times above this threshold. 
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weather conditions at the time of the accident, an indicator for whether the accident occurred at 
night, and an indicator for whether the accident occurred on a weekend.22 
Estimates of equation (3) are reported in the first column of Table 3.  Full implementation 
of the ACA is associated with an increase in ambulance response times of 0.28 minutes, or 
approximately 17 seconds, which is arguably too small to warrant the attention of policymakers.  
However, a DD estimation strategy is, obviously, far from ideal (Courtemanche et al., 2017a, p. 
186).  In an effort to account for national- and state-level shocks to response times, we estimate a 
DDD-style regression of the form: 
 
(4)  Response Timeacst = β0 + β1(Postt x Uninsured2013c) + β2(Postt x Uninsured2013c x 
Medicaid Expansions) + 𝜷3
′ Xacst+ θc + γst + εacst,  
 
Estimates of β1 and β2, which are reported in the remaining columns of Table 3, can be thought 
of as causal under the assumption that county-level uninsured rates in 2013 would have been 
uncorrelated with the change in ambulance response times had the ACA not been implemented.   
Our focus is on the estimated effect of the full ACA, which is calculated, as earlier, at the mean 
of the pre-ACA uninsured rates, 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013𝑐 .  Specifically, the effect of the ACA in non-
expansion states is given by β1 x 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013𝑐 , while the effect of the ACA in expansion 
states is given by (β1 + β2) 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013𝑐.   
Without controlling for the variables in the vector 𝑿𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑡, full implementation of the ACA 
is associated with an increase in ambulance response times of 1.8 minutes (i.e., one minute and 
                                                 
22 The weather conditions indicators are for rain, sleet, snow, fog, wind, blowing dirt, cloud cover, blowing snow, 
freezing rain, and other hazardous conditions.  Means and standard deviations of all the variables used in the 
accident-level regressions are shown in Appendix Table A2.  
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48 seconds), which represents an almost 18 percent increase relative to the mean of 10.08.  
Controlling for the variables in the vector 𝑿𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑡, full implementation of the ACA is associated 
with an increase in ambulance response times of 1.89 minutes, or almost 19 percent relative to 
the mean. 
 
3.1. Adopting response-time cutoffs from the medical literature 
Medical researchers interested in the determinants of trauma survival have often focused 
on whether EMS workers arrived within a specified period of time.  For instance, Pons et al. 
(2005) found that the odds of survival were reduced by 30% if an ambulance failed to arrive on 
scene within 4 minutes.23  By contrast, these authors found that failure to arrive within 8 minutes 
was not associated with the odds of survival (Pons et al., 2005).24  The National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA), which publishes guidelines for the operation of all emergency services, 
recommends a 4 minute response time for basic life support and an 8 minute response time for 
advanced life support (NFPA 2010). 
In Table 4, we re-estimate equation (4), replacing Response Time, which is measured in 
minutes, with an indicator for whether the ambulance failed to arrive within a particular window.  
Specifically, we consider 4 cutoffs:  failure to arrive within 4 minutes, 8 minutes, 13 minutes, 
and 20 minutes.  The 4-minute cutoff is based on Pons et al. (2005) and has been used by other 
medical researchers (Eisenberg et al., 1984; Callaham and Madsen, 1996).  The 8-minute cutoff 
                                                 
23 See also Blackwell and Kaufman  (2002), who found that the risk of patient death increased threefold if EMS 
workers failed to arrive on scene within 5 minutes of receiving an emergency call.  Newgard et al. (2010) examined 
whether the time elapsed from when EMS workers arrived on scene and when the patient was admitted to the 
hospital.  These authors concluded that reducing this time had no effect on the odds of patient survival.   
 
24 The 8-minute cutoff was chosen by Pons et al. (2005) because it is “commonly accepted” that EMS personnel 
should arrive on scene within 8 minutes of notification (Shah, 2006, p. 420).  In fact, many EMS contracts stipulate 
response times of less than 8 minutes for 90% of emergency calls (Pons and Markovchick, 2002). 
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can be thought of as the EMS industry standard (Pons and Markovchick, 2002; Shah, 2006; 
NFPA, 2010) and corresponds to the median ambulance response time observed in FARS.  The 
13- and 20-minute cutoffs correspond to the 75th and 90th pre-ACA percentiles of ambulance 
response times in the FARS data.   
 The results suggest that implementation of the ACA had little impact on whether 
ambulances arrived within 4 minutes, the cutoff proposed by Pons et al. (2005).  Not only are the 
estimated coefficients reported in column (1) of Table 4 statistically insignificant, they are also 
extremely small relative to the mean of the dependent variable. 0.79.  By contrast, there is strong 
evidence that the ACA resulted in fewer ambulances arriving within 8 minutes, the EMS 
industry standard: at the mean of the pre-ACA uninsured rate, full implementation is associated 
with an increase of 0.096 in the probability of not arriving within 8 minutes, a 21% increase 
relative to the mean of 0.45.  Full implementation is also associated with an increase of 0.093 in 
the probability of not arriving within 13 minutes, a 43% increase relative to the mean 
(0.093/0.216 = 0.431).  The estimated effect of full implementation on the probability of not 
arriving within 20 minutes is 0.049, which represents an almost 60% increase relative to the 
mean (0.049/0.084 = 0.583).   
 
3.2. The effects of the ACA on other outcomes  
 Up to this point in the analysis, we have focused on ambulance response times, but FARS 
also contains information on hospital arrival times.  In the first column of Table 5, we report 
estimates of equation (4) in which response time is replaced with the time (in minutes) that 
elapsed between when the ambulance arrived at the scene of the accident and when it arrived at 
the hospital.  If the closest emergency department is too congested, ambulances are routinely 
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diverted to less busy, but more distant, emergency departments (Schull et al., 2003).  Therefore, 
implementation of the ACA could have affected this alternative outcome through emergency 
room congestion (Schull et al., 2003; Wilper et al., 2008; Garthwaite et al., 2017).  Full 
implementation is, in fact, associated with an increase in time to hospital of 1.27 minutes.  
However, this estimate is not significant at conventional levels.  Moreover, it is quite modest in 
terms of magnitude, representing a 3% increase relative to the mean (1.27/42.86 = 0.030). 
 Next, we explore whether the ACA affected fatal accident totals in FARS.  If ambulances 
were indeed slower to arrive on scene, this could have reduced the likelihood of survival (Durkin 
et al., 2005; Zwerling et al., 2005; Li et al. 2008; Gonzalez et al., 2009; Sánchez-Mangas, 2010) 
and, as a consequence, increased the total number of fatal accidents observed in FARS, which 
represents a complete census of all fatal MVCs.25  To conduct this analysis, we collapsed the 
FARS data into county-year cells and estimated equation (4) using the total number of fatalities 
in county c and year t as the outcome.  The results are reported in the second column of Table 5.  
Full implementation of the ACA is associated with 5.17 additional fatal accidents per county-
year.  Although sizeable (the mean number of fatalities per county-year was 6.13), because this 
estimate is not statistically significant we cannot rule out the possibility that the ACA had no 
effect on the total number of fatal accidents.  Likewise, implementation of the ACA is associated 
with 5.38 additional fatalities resulting from MVCs, but again this estimate is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
 Finally, we used data from the County Business Patterns, published by the Census 
Bureau, to construct two additional outcomes: (1) the number of workers who provided 
                                                 
25 Recall that FARS does not include information on non-fatal accidents.  If an injured driver or passenger survived 
because an ambulance arrived quickly, then information on the accident that produced the injury would not be 
included in FARS.  Below, we show that the implementation of the ACA did not affect accident observables in the 
FARS data, suggesting any shift the underlying accident-generating process was negligible. 
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ambulance services in county c and year t, and (2) the average salary of these workers in county 
c and year t.26  Estimates of equation (4) using these alternative outcomes are reported in the 
remaining columns of Table 5.  These estimates provide little evidence that the ACA led to 
changes in the supply of EMS services, at least in the short run.   
 
3.3. Specification checks 
In this section, we present results from a variety of regressions with the goal of ruling out 
potential endogeneity concerns.  As a test of the parallel trends assumption, we estimate an 
event-study model that interacts treatment (i.e., Uninsured and Uninsured x Medicaid 
Expansion) with the full set of year fixed effects (omitting 2013 as the base year).  If the 
identifying assumptions of the DDD model hold, the estimated coefficients of these interactions 
should be statistically indistinguishable from zero.  In the top panel of Table 6, we report the 
event-study results for the ambulance response outcomes using the full set of controls.  The 
effect of full implementation in the post-ACA period is, as before, given the in the bottom panel 
of Table 6.  There are 24 falsification tests (6 parameters of interest in each of 4 regressions), but 
only one significant estimate at the 5% level.  This is less than would be expected by chance and 
provides assurance that the estimates in the bottom panel of Table 6 can be thought of 
representing the causal effects of ACA. 
Next, because traffic congestion can have a powerful effect on ambulance response times 
(Peters and Hall, 1999; Lee and Fazio, 2005; Ghosh et al., 2014), it also represents a potential 
threat to our preferred identification strategy.  If, for instance, the 2013 uninsured rate were 
positively correlated with the change in congestion from 2013 to the post-ACA period, this could 
                                                 
26 Specifically, we constructed employee counts and average annual salary (total annual payroll divided by 
employees) using the NAICS code 621910 (ambulance services).  Counties had to have at least three establishments 
that provided ambulance services. 
19 
 
impart an upwards bias to our estimates of the relationship between the ACA and ambulance 
response times.  To address this potential source of bias, we utilized information from the 
“Urban Mobility Scorecard”, produced by the Texas A&M Transportation Institute.  
Specifically, we included two new controls on the right-hand side of equation (4), both of which 
are available on an annual basis for 101 metropolitan areas in the United States: the first, Hours 
Lost to Traffic, is equal to the average time spent by commuters waiting in traffic per year; the 
second, the Time Index, is calculated as the ratio of peak-period travel time to free-flow travel 
time faced by commuters.   
The results of this exercise, reported in Table 7, provide no evidence that the interactions 
Post x Uninsured and Post x Uninsured x Medicaid Expansion are somehow capturing the 
influence of traffic congestion.  In column (1) of Table 7, we show the effect of the ACA on 
ambulance response times in counties that belong to the 101 U.S. metropolitan areas for which 
we have information on traffic congestion.  Full implementation is associated with an increase in 
response times of 3.31 minutes, an estimate which is considerably larger than the estimated first 
reported in Table 3.  This result provides additional evidence that the effect of the ACA on 
ambulance response times was more pronounced in more populous, urban counties.  In the 
second and third columns of Table 7, we control for traffic congestion by including Hours Lost 
to Traffic and the Time Index on the right-hand side of equation (4).  The resulting estimates of 
the effect of full implementation are statistically significant and are of comparable magnitude to 
the estimate in the first column of Table 7, suggesting that the relationship between pre-ACA 
uninsured rates and ambulance response times is not simply a reflection of worsening traffic.27 
                                                 
27 In Appendix Table A3, we test if the relationship between the ACA and whether an ambulance arrived within 8 
minutes is sensitive to controlling for these same traffic congestion measures.  In Appendix Tables A4 and A5, we 
report estimates of equation (4) controlling for 4 proxies of traffic congestion at the county-year level: employment 
in “support activities for road transportation” (NAICS code 4884), average concentration of carbon monoxide (CO), 
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 In Table 8, we explore the sensitivity of our estimates to controlling for local economic 
conditions, an important driver of pre-ACA uninsured rates.  Specifically, we report estimates of 
equation (4) with median household income, the poverty rate and the unemployment rate in the 
vector 𝑿𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑡.  These measures were obtained from published sources and are at the county-year 
level.28  The results suggest that the relationship between pre-ACA uninsured rates and 
ambulance response times is not a reflection of local economic conditions. 
 Up to this point, we have excluded counties with a population of less than 10,000 from 
our analyses in an effort to ensure that the pre-ACA uninsured rate estimates were sufficiently 
precise.  In Appendix Table A6, we explore whether our results are robust to removing this 
exclusion.  In addition, we experiment with excluding counties with population less than 20,000 
as well as excluding counties with a population of less than 30,000.  The estimated effect of the 
ACA on ambulance response times is positive and significant across these different samples, but 
becomes larger as we focus on more populous counties.29  Our baseline sample selection criteria 
can therefore be considered conservative.30 
                                                                                                                                                             
average concentration of nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and a measure of fine particulate pollution.  Information on 
NAICS code 4884 employment was obtained from County Business Patterns, published by the Census Bureau.  
Information on pollution levels was obtained from the Air Quality System database, collected by the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  We focused on these pollutants because nationally 50% of carbon monoxide emissions are 
caused by motor vehicles, 34% of nitrogen dioxide emissions are caused by motor vehicles, and 11% of fine 
particulate matter (PM 2.5) is caused by motor vehicle emissions (Ernst, Corless and Greene-Roesel 2003). The 
results provide no evidence that the relationship between pre-ACA uninsured rates and ambulance response times is 
not a reflection of worsening traffic.   
 
28 Data on median household income, the poverty rate, and population are from SAIPE (Small Area Income and 
Poverty Estimates), produced by the U.S. Census Bureau.  County-by-year estimates of the local unemployment rate 
are from LAUS (Local Area Unemployment Statistics), produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 
29 For instance, when we exclude counties with a population of less than 30,000 from the analysis, full 
implementation is associated with an increase in ambulance response times of 2.74 minutes, which is almost 45% 
larger than our original estimate reported in Table 3. 
 
30 Table A7 reports the results from additional robustness checks.  Twenty states and the District of Columbia 
partially expanded Medicaid under the ACA prior to 2014.  Following Kaestner et al. (2015), we experimented with 
excluding states from the analysis that partially expanded Medicaid under the ACA prior to 2014 but did not fully 
expand on January 1, 2014 (IN, ME, TN, WI, DE, DC, MA, NY and VT).  We also experimented with excluding 
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 In a final set of specification checks, we examined whether the implementation of the 
ACA was associated with changes in accident observables.  Specifically, we regressed the 
personal characteristics of people killed in MVCs (i.e., race, gender, age) on Post x Uninsured, 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid Expansion, a set of county indicators, and year-by-state indicators.  
In addition, we regressed measures of accident victims’ behavior (e.g., an indicator for whether 
the victim was wearing a seat belt, and an indicator for whether the driver’s Blood Alcohol 
Content was over the legal limit) and other MVC observables on these same right-hand-side 
variables.  Because a MVC must produce at least one fatality to be included in FARS, any 
association between the implementation of the ACA and accident victim characteristics could 
reflect a shift in the underlying accident-generating process.  For instance, although not 
statistically significant, the estimates reported earlier in Table 5 raise the possibility that full 
implementation of the ACA led to substantially more traffic fatalities and fatal MVCs.  
Econometrically, it is not obvious that this phenomenon, in and of itself, would bias our 
estimates, but changes in accident observables could potentially explain the post-ACA increase 
in ambulance response times.  The results of this exercise are reported in Appendix Tables A8-
A9.  Although we ran 17 separate regressions, only one produced a statistically significant 
estimate of full implementation.  The other estimates of full implementation were, without 
exception, small and statistically insignificant.  This pattern of results is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the observed increase in ambulance response time is due to the ACA rather than 
                                                                                                                                                             
states from the analysis that partially expanded Medicaid under the ACA and fully expanded on January 1, 2014 
(AZ, CA, CT, CO, HI, IL, IA, MD, MN, NJ, OR, RI and WA).  The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 3.  Finally, we re-estimated the relationship between the ACA and response times using the 
average uninsured rate from 2011-2013 instead of the 2013 uninsured rate.  Again, the results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 3.  
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other factors, including endogenous selection into the sample, correlated with the intensity of 
treatment.   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 A substantial literature examines the potential benefits of health insurance expansions on 
access to medical care and various health outcomes, but relatively few studies have explored a 
potential pitfall: the inability of providers of health care services to keep up with demand, 
causing capacity shortfalls, at least in the short term.  We help fill this void by leveraging 
variation in county pre-treatment uninsured rates and state Medicaid expansions to explore 
whether implementation of the ACA led to an increase in ambulance response times.  
Our estimates suggest that, after two years, full implementation of the ACA led to an 
increase in insurance coverage of approximately 5 percentage points and an increase in 
ambulance response time of 1.89 minutes (or one minute and 53 seconds).  Together, these 
estimates suggest that every percentage point increase in insurance enrollment in a given county 
due to the ACA slowed down ambulances in that county by approximately 22.8 seconds, which 
implies a short run elasticity of ambulance response time with respect to insurance enrollment of 
3.2.    
In addition to examining the effect of the ACA on response times in minutes, we 
considered two cutoffs from the medical literature: failure to arrive within 4 minutes, and failure 
to arrive within 8 minutes.  Our results suggest that every percentage point increase in insurance 
enrollment led to an almost 0.02 percentage point increase in the probability of an ambulance 
arriving after 8 minutes, the industry-recommended response time.  However, we found no 
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evidence that the ACA affected the probability of responding after 4 minutes, which Pons et al. 
(2005) suggest may be more relevant for MVC patient outcomes than the 8-minute cutoff.   
 While the nature of the FARS data required that we focus on MVCs, our results likely 
have implications for non-MVC emergencies as well.  Cardiac arrest survival is particularly 
sensitive to ambulance response times, (Pell et al., 2001; Vukmir, 2006; O’Keeffe et al., 2011), 
with the most recent study finding that a one-minute reduction in response time was associated 
with a 24 percent improvement in survival odds.  There is additional research showing that when 
distance travelled is used as an instrument for response time, a one-minute increase in response 
time increases mortality risk for all emergencies by 8 to 17 percent (Wilde 2012).  Therefore, if 
the response times in the FARS are representative of all ambulances, then the estimated 
ambulance slowdowns may have had a profound impact on patient outcomes for non-MVC 
emergencies. 
 We present suggestive evidence supporting the external validity of our estimates in Table 
9.  Table 9 reports average ambulance response times for all ambulances based on public reports 
put out by several cities and by the state of Florida.  Alongside those averages, Table 9 reports 
the average response time for the corresponding location based on the FARS.  The averages are 
quite similar, making the argument that our results generalize to all ambulances and not just 
those responding to fatal MVCs plausible.  If this is the case, then the short run ambulance 
slowdowns due to the ACA were likely quite costly in terms of patient outcomes given the large 
magnitudes found for the effect of response time on patient outcomes for events such as cardiac 
arrest (Pell et al., 2001; Vukmir, 2006; O’Keeffe et al., 2011). 
 Finally, note that we provide only one piece of a much larger puzzle with regard to 
evaluating the costs and benefits of the ACA.  Even if the ACA increased wait times for various 
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medical services, the resulting welfare losses should be evaluated alongside other factors such as 
the costs of the Medicaid expansion and subsidies and the welfare gains from risk protection and, 
potentially, improved health.  Moreover, it is possible that the increase in wait times could prove 
to be transitory, as adjusting the quantity of medical services provided may be more feasible in 
the long run than the short run.  Nonetheless, our research provides a novel addition to the body 
of evidence on provider shortages and their implications for policy. 
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Figure 1. Volume of EMS Dispatches in New York City 2013-2015 
 
Notes: Data come from New York City EMS Incident Dispatch data file.  Grouping (i.e., bottom vs. top-half of 
severity scores) is based on the 2013 severity score distribution. 
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Table 1. The ACA and Proportion Insured 
  
            (1) (2) 
Post   0.043***    
 (0.003)  
Post x Medicaid expansion    0.013***  
 (0.008)  
Post x Uninsured  0.165*** 
  (0.051) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion   0.115* 
  (0.062) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion    0.043***     0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) 
Medicaid expansion     0.013*** 0.021* 
 (0.008) (0.011) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)   0.057***  0.050*** 
 (.007) (0.006) 
  
County fixed effects yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects no yes 
Observations  14,663 14,663 
Mean of dependent variable  0.842 0.842 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from county-year level regressions are shown. Data on insurance 
coverage rates are from the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) program and 
cover the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are 
in parentheses.  Estimates weighted by county population from the 2010 Census.  Counties 
with population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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      Table 2. The ACA and Insurance Coverage: Separating Post into 2014 and 2015 
  
Proportion Insured 
2014 x Uninsured    0.126** 
 (0.050) 
2014 x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  0.080 
 (0.058) 
2015 x Uninsured   0.204*** 
 (0.052) 
2015 x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  0.150** 
 (0.066) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion, 2014  0.023** 
 (0.009) 
Medicaid expansion, 2014 0.014 
 (0.010) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion), 2014    0.037*** 
 (0.005) 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion, 2015    0.037*** 
 (0.009) 
Medicaid expansion, 2015  0.027** 
 (0.012) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion), 2015   0.063*** 
 (0.007) 
County fixed effects yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes 
Observations  14,663 
Mean of dependent variable  0.842 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from a county-year level regression are shown. Data on insurance coverage rates 
are from the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) program and cover the period 2010-2015.  
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Estimates weighted by 
county population from the 2010 Census.  Counties with population of less than 10,000 are excluded from 
the analysis. 
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Table 3. The ACA and Ambulance Response Times in Minutes 
  
          (1)                       (2)                      (3) 
Post -0.03   
 (0.33)   
Post x Medicaid expansion 0.32   
 (0.34)   
Post x Uninsured    6.09*** 5.87** 
  (2.43) (2.34) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion   4.26 4.95 
  (4.30) (4.00) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion -0.03 1.06**  1.02** 
 (0.33) (0.75) (0.41) 
Medicaid expansion  0.32 0.76 0.86 
 (0.34) (0.75) (0.70) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)  0.28**   1.80**  1.89** 
 (0.13) (0.69) (0.65) 
  
Weather indicators yes  yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes  yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects no yes yes 
Observations  84,185 84,185 84,185 
Mean of dependent variable  10.08 10.08 10.08 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data on are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS) for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that 
occurred in counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 4. The ACA and Ambulance Response Time Cutoffs  
 
                                                                        > 4 minutes         > 8 minutes        > 13 minutes       > 20 minutes 
Post x Uninsured   -0.006         0.232 0.265*   0.178*** 
  (0.148) (0.144) (0.149) (0.063) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  0.029 0.322 0.270 0.104 
 (0.281) (0.230) (0.214) (0.095) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion -0.001 0.040  0.046*    0.031*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.011) 
Medicaid expansion  0.005 0.056 0.047 0.018 
 (0.049) (0.040) (0.037) (0.017) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)  0.004   0.096***    0.093***   0.049*** 
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.032) (0.018) 
  
Weather indicators yes yes yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations  84,185 84,185 84,185 84,185 
Mean of dependent variable  0.794 0.450 0.216 0.084 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) for 
the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that occurred in 
counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 5. The ACA and Other Outcomes  
 
Time 
Accident 
to Hospital 
Number of 
Fatal 
Accidents 
Number of 
Fatalities 
Employees in 
Ambulance 
Services 
Average 
Annual Salary 
in Ambulance 
Services 
(Thousands) 
Post x Uninsured  -8.36 -3.59 4.24 -423.65 -32.75 
 (12.81) (48.00) (55.05) (409.49) (29.21) 
Post x Uninsured x 
Medicaid expansion  
15.66 33.26 26.64 118.76 29.50 
(27.52) (52.47) (59.33) (1818.64) (33.64) 
    
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate:   
ACA w/o Medicaid 
expansion 
-1.46 -0.63 0.74 -64.65 -5.00 
(2.23) (8.37) (9.60) (62.49) (4.46) 
Medicaid  2.73 5.80 4.65 18.12 4.50 
 (4.80) (9.15) (10.35) (277.52) (5.13) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid expansion) 
 1.27 5.17 5.38 -46.53 -0.50 
(4.41) (3.70) (3.86) (270.49) (2.55) 
    
Weather indicators yes no no no no 
Night and weekend 
indicators  
yes no no no no 
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  20,343 13,356 13,356 1,769 1,769 
Mean of dependent 
variable  
42.86 6.13 6.71 294.60 30.73 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: In the first column, we report OLS estimates from an accident-level regression.  The regressions in the 
remaining columns are at the county-year level and are weighted by county population from the 2010 Census.  Data 
are from the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  
Accidents that occurred in counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 6. The ACA and Insurance Coverage: Event-Study Analysis 
 
                                                                           Minutes             8 minutes          13 minutes           20 minutes 
2010 x Uninsured -2.098 0.408 0.069 -0.044 
 (5.864) (0.268) (0.244) (0.150) 
2010 x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion 5.312 -0.027 0.290 0.084 
 (8.055) (0.413) (0.365) (0.195) 
2011 x Uninsured -5.391 0.060 -0.205 -0.112 
 (4.431) (0.214) (0.211) (0.163) 
2011 x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion 2.670 -0.021 0.122 -0.013 
 (6.896) (0.353) (0.287) (0.218) 
2012 x Uninsured -3.363 0.420** 0.105 -0.233 
 (4.243) (0.196) (0.228) (0.172) 
2012 x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  2.395 -0.041 -0.044 0.260 
 (6.367) (0.302) (0.285) (0.208) 
Post x Uninsured 3.773 0.451** 0.280 0.100 
 (3.113) (0.185) (0.186) (0.093) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion 6.217 0.303 0.309 0.148 
 (4.463) (0.272) (0.250) (0.094) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion 0.655 0.078** 0.049 0.017 
 (0.540) (0.032) (0.032) (0.016) 
Medicaid expansion  1.079 0.053 0.054 0.026 
 (0.774) (0.047) (0.043) (0.016) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) 1.733** 0.130*** 0.102** 0.043** 
 (0.797) (0.033) (0.042) (0.017) 
  
Weather indicators yes yes yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations  84,185 84,185 84,185 84,185 
Mean of dependent variable  10.08 0.450 0.216 0.084 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that occurred in 
counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 7. The ACA and Ambulance Response Times in 101 Metropolitan Areas: Adding Controls 
for Traffic Congestion  
                                                                                                           
                                                                                                               (1)                         (2)                         (3) 
Post x Uninsured 4.08 3.67 4.82 
 (7.96) (8.08) (7.83) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  16.66*** 16.83** 16.38** 
 (7.25) (7.24) (7.16) 
Hours Lost to Traffic   -0.04  
  (0.17)  
Travel Time Index    18.00 
   (30.38) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion 0.65 0.59          0.77 
 (1.27) (1.29) (1.25) 
Medicaid expansion  2.66** 2.69** 2.61** 
 (1.57) (1.55) (1.14) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)   3.31***   3.27**   3.38*** 
 (0.13) (0.66) (0.68) 
  
Weather indicators yes yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes 
Observations  14,279 14,279 14,279 
Mean of dependent variable  8.53 8.53 8.53 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data on are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS) for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Sample 
restricted to accidents that occurred in the 101 metropolitan areas for which traffic congestion data were available. See Schrank 
et al. (2015) for more information on these areas and how the traffic congestion variables were constructed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Table 8. The ACA and Ambulance Response Times: Adding Local Economic Controls 
  
          (1)                       (2)                      (3) 
Post x Uninsured 5.87** 5.84** 6.75*** 
 (2.34) (2.28) (2.32) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  4.95 4.77 4.90 
 (4.00) (3.98) (3.97) 
Median Household Income (thousands)  -0.011 -0.012 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
Poverty Rate  0.589 0.056 
  (3.95) (4.00) 
Population (millions)  -0.153 -0.159 
  (0.207) (0.209) 
Unemployment Rate   0.178* 
   (0.102) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion  1.02** 1.02** 1.18*** 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) 
Medicaid expansion  0.86 0.83 0.85 
 (0.70) (0.69) (0.69) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)  1.89** 1.85*** 2.03*** 
 (0.65) (0.66) (0.67) 
  
Weather indicators yes yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes 
Observations  84,185 84,184 84,184 
Mean of dependent variable  10.08 10.08 10.08 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data on are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS) for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that 
occurred in counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 9. Comparison of FARS Response Times to All Response Times 
   
Average Ambulance Response Time For 
 
 
Locality 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Fatal Accidents (FARS) 
 
 
All Ambulances 
    
Manhattan, NY 2010 4:51 4:21 
    
Washington D.C. 2014 6:52 6:18 
    
Oklahoma City, OK 2010 7:04 7:06 
    
Milwaukee, WI 2010 5:06 5:14 
    
Florida 2013 8:53 10:40 
Notes: Response times for localities are drawn from: NYC OpenData (2017b), D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical 
Services Department (2017), Lansdale (2011), City of Milwaukee Fire Department (2011) and Florida Department 
of Health (2015). 
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A1. Did the Implementation of the ACA Affect Whether 
Ambulance Response Time was Missing in FARS? 
  
Missing 
response time 
 
Post x Uninsured  -0.0008  
 (0.0015)  
 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  -0.0022 
(0.0032) 
 
 
 
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
  
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion 
 
 
Medicaid Alone 
 
 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) 
 
 
 
 
Weather 
Weekday/Weekend 
County fixed effects 
State-by-year fixed effects 
           -0.015 
(0.026) 
 
-0.039 
(0.056) 
 
-0.054 
 (0.050) 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
 
Observations 183,532  
R-squared 
Mean Outcome 
0.52 
.448 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from an accident-level regression of an indicator for missing response time on Post 
x Uninsured, Post x Uninsured x Medicaid Expansion, a set of accident-level controls, county fixed 
effects, and state-by-year fixed effects are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS) for the period 2010-2015.   Estimates weighted by county population from the 2010 Census.  
Counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis.  Standard errors, corrected 
for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table A2. Descriptive Statistics 
  
 
Full Sample 
 
Medicaid 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion 
States 
 
Before 
ACA 
 
After 
ACA 
Ambulance Timing      
Time to Accident 10.082 9.603 10.711 10.004 10.253 
 (8.741) (8.861) (8.540) (8.425) (9.397) 
Slower than 4 minutes  0.973 0.765 0.831 0.791 0.800 
 (0.405) (0.424) (0.375) (0.407) (0.400) 
Slower than 8 minutes 0.450 0.419 0.491 0.447 0.455 
 (0.497) (0.493) (0.500) (0.497) (0.498) 
Slower than 13 minutes 0.216 0.194 0.244 0.215 0.217 
 (0.411) (0.396) (0.429) (0.411) (0.412) 
Slower than 20 minutes 0.084 0.073 0.099 0.084 0.085 
 (0.278) (0.261) (0.298) (0.277) (0.280) 
Time to Hospital 42.861 42.750 42.968 42.673 43.609 
 (24.058) (24.058) (22.163) (23.843) (24.885) 
Weather Conditions      
Rain 0.070 0.072 0.068 0.067 0.073 
 (0.255) (0.259) (0.251) (0.253) (0.261) 
Sleet 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) 
Snow 0.017 0.023 0.009 0.018 0.015 
 (0.128) (0.149) (0.094) (0.131) (0.121) 
Fog 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.101) (0.104) (0.098) 
Cloudy 0.165 0.162 0.168 0.163 0.169 
 (0.371) (0.368) (0.374) (0.369) (0.374) 
Blowing Snow 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.028) (0.038) (0.035) 
Freezing Rain 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.012) (0.034) 
Wind 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.036) 
Blowing Dirt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.042) (0.019) 
Other Inclement Weather 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.034) (0.035) (0.041) 
Time of Accident      
Nighttime Accident 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.484 0.482 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
Weekend Accident 0.340 0.337 0.342 0.342 0.333 
 (0.474) (0.473) (0.474) (0.474) (0.471) 
Observations 84,240 47,817 36,423 57,945 26,295 
Notes: counties with less than 10,000 population are excluded from the analysis.  Means (and standard deviations) shown.  
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Appendix Table A3. The ACA and Likelihood of Ambulance Arriving > than 8 Minutes in 101 
Metropolitan Areas: Adding Controls for Traffic Congestion 
 
                                                                                                       (1)                     (2)                      (3) 
Post x Uninsured 1.001 1.024 1.006 
 (0.747) (0.732) (0.734) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  0.700 0.690 0.698 
 (0.762) (0.749) (0.759) 
Hours Lost to Traffic   0.002  
  (0.008)  
Travel Time Index   0.137 
   (1.314) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion 0.160 0.163  0.161 
 (0.119) (0.117) (0.117) 
Medicaid expansion  0.112 0.110 0.111 
 (0.122) (0.120) (0.121) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)   0.271***     0.273***    0.272*** 
 (0.089) (0.89) (0.088) 
  
Weather indicators yes yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes 
Observations  14,279 14,279 14,279 
Mean of dependent variable  0.348 0.348 0.348 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data on are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS) for the period 2010-2015.   Counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. Standard 
errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Sample restricted to accidents that occurred in the 101 
metropolitan areas for which traffic congestion data were available.  See Schrank et al. (2015) for more information on these 
areas and how the traffic congestion variables were constructed. 
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Table A4. The ACA and Ambulance Response Times Controlling for Employment in 
NAICS Code 4884 (Support Activities for Road Transportation) 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
Post x Uninsured 9.452 10.650* 
 (5.805) (5.589) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  1.684 1.304 
 (7.077) (6.906) 
Employment in NAICS code 4884  0.004** 
  (0.002) 
 
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion 1.476 1.664* 
 (0.907) (0.873) 
Medicaid expansion  0.263 0.204 
 (1.105) (1.079) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)  1.740   1.867 
 (1.209) (1.193) 
 
Weather indicators yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes 
Observations  22,884 22,884 
Mean of dependent variable  8.616 8.616 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
Notes: OLS estimates from an accident-level regression of ambulance response times (in minutes) on Post x 
Uninsured, Post x Uninsured x Medicaid Expansion, a set of accident-level controls, county fixed effects, and state-
by-year fixed effects are shown.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  
Estimates weighted by county population from the 2010 Census.  Accidents that occurred in counties with a 
population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis.  Employment data are from the U.S. Census County 
Business Patterns and are only populated for counties with at least 3 employers. 
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Table A5. The ACA and Ambulance Response Times with Controls for Traffic-Related 
Pollutants 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post x Uninsured 21.893* 20.888* 7.778 7.320 10.058* 10.270* 
 (11.283) (11.638) (8.432) (8.902) (5.382) (5.416) 
Post x Uninsured x 
Medicaid expansion  
0.428 1.415 16.853** 16.611** 7.576 7.548 
(11.176) (11.456) (7.829) (7.963) (6.287) (6.279) 
Carbon Monoxide (CO)   -2.278     
 (1.565)     
Nitrogen Dioxide 
(NO2) 
   -0.115   
   (0.095)   
Fine Particulate Matter 
(PM 2.5) 
     -0.114 
     (0.069) 
      
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured 
rate: 
    
ACA w/o Medicaid 
expansion 
3.439* 3.281* 1.252 1.179 1.579* 1.612* 
(1.773) (1.828) (1.358) (1.433) (0.845) (0.850) 
Medicaid expansion  0.067 0.222 2.713** 2.674** 1.190 1.185 
 (1.756) (1.780) (1.261) (1.282) (0.987) (0.986) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
expansion) 
3.507*** 3.504*** 3.967*** 3.853*** 2.769*** 2.797*** 
(1.064) (1.100) (0.775) (0.783) (0.787) (0.783) 
      
Weather indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Night and weekend 
indicators  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  10,047 10,047 11,242 11,242 23,367 23,367 
Mean of dependent 
variable  
7.764 7.764 8.482 8.482 8.734 8.734 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from an accident-level regression of ambulance response times (in minutes) on Post x Uninsured, Post x 
Uninsured x Medicaid Expansion, a set of accident-level controls, county fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects are shown.  
Data on are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for 
clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that occurred in counties with a population of less than 10,000 are 
excluded from the analysis.  Pollution data are from the Environmental Protection Agency’s Air Quality System Database. 
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Appendix Table A6. The ACA and Ambulance Response Times: Alternative Samples 
                    
                        
                         All U.S. 
                         counties                   
 
Counties with 
population <  
10k excluded 
 
Counties with 
population <  
20k excluded 
 
Counties with 
population <  
30k excluded 
Post x Uninsured   5.94**          5.87** 6.23**   9.04** 
  (2.32) (2.34) (2.71) (3.62) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  3.78 4.95 5.31 7.38 
 (4.11) (4.00) (4.42) (4.98) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion  1.07**  1.02**  1.06**  1.02** 
 (0.42) (0.41) (0.46) (0.41) 
Medicaid expansion  0.68 0.86 0.90 0.86 
 (0.74) (0.70) (0.75) (0.70) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion)  1.743**  1.89**   1.96***   2.74*** 
 (0.73) (0.65) (0.70) (0.74) 
  
Weather indicators yes yes yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations  87,823 84,185 78,244 71,689 
Mean of dependent variable  10.38 10.08 9.79 9.46 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) for the 
period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table A7. The ACA and Ambulance Response Times: Measurement Issues 
                                       
              
             
               Use average           
                  of 2011-2013                   
                     uninsured rate                                    
Exclude “early 
expanders” that 
did not fully 
expand on 
January 1, 2014 
 
 
Exclude “early 
 expanders” that 
fully expanded on 
January 1, 2014 
 
 
 
Exclude    
all “early 
expanders” 
Post x Uninsured      7.51***           5.23**   5.41**   4.73** 
  (2.69) (2.30) (2.29) (2.25) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  -0.55 5.71 3.10 7.38 
  (4.87) (4.30) (3.90) (4.30) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion   1.30***   0.95**   0.98**  0.90** 
 (0.47) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) 
Medicaid expansion  -0.094 1.03 0.563 0.71 
 (0.850) (0.77) (0.71) (0.82) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) 1.201*  1.97**   1.55**   1.61* 
 (0.699) (0.74) (0.67) (0.80) 
  
Weather indicators yes yes yes yes 
Night and weekend indicators  yes yes yes yes 
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations  84,185 84,185 78,244 71,689 
Mean of dependent variable  10.08 10.29 10.16 10.44 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from accident-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) for 
the period 2010-2015.  Counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis.  Standard errors, corrected for 
clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  The “Early Expanders” that expanded their Medicaid programs under the ACA before 
2014 but did not fully expand on January 1, 2014, were IN, ME, TN, WI, DE, DC, MA, NY and VT.  The “Early Expanders” that 
fully expanded on January 1, 2014 were AZ, CA, CT, CO, HI, IL, IA, MD, MN, NJ, OR, RI and WA.  
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Appendix Table A8. The ACA and the Personal Characteristics of Individuals Killed in 
MVCs. 
   
Deceased was a 
White Male 
Deceased was 
a White 
Female 
Deceased 
was a Black 
Male 
Deceased 
was a Black 
Female 
Post x Uninsured  -0.062 0.005 0.056 0.005 
 (0.086) (0.097) (0.038) (0.032) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  -0.062 0.079 0.076 0.046 
 (0.215) (0.158) (0.058) (0.062) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion -0.011 0.001 0.010 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) 
Medicaid expansion  0.011 0.014 0.014 0.008 
 (0.039) (0.028) (0.010) (0.011) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) 0.022 0.015 0.024*** 0.009 
 (0.035) (0.022) (0.008) (0.009) 
  
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations  148,798 148,798 148,798 148,798 
Mean of dependent variable  0.582 0.245 0.090 0.035 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from individual-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that occurred in 
counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Appendix Table A8 (continued). The ACA and the Personal Characteristics of Individuals 
Killed in MVCs  
   
Deceased was 
a Hispanic 
Male 
Deceased 
was a 
Hispanic 
Female 
 
 
Deceased was 
an Asian Male 
 
Deceased was 
an Asian 
Female 
 
 
Age of 
Deceased 
Post x Uninsured  -0.079 -0.109*** -0.003 0.003 1.87 
 (0.156) (0.028) (0.009) (0.010) (4.71) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid 
expansion  
0.096 0.159*** -0.009 0.058 3.52 
 (0.184) (0.046) (0.039) (0.049) (7.78) 
   
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate:  
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion -0.014 -0.020*** -0.001 0.001 0.334 
 (0.028) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.844) 
Medicaid expansion  0.017 0.029*** -0.002 0.010 0.630 
 (0.033) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (1.395) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
expansion) 
0.003 0.009 -0.002 0.011 0.965 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (1.111) 
   
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  165,730 165,730 148,798 148,798 165,618 
Mean of dependent variable  0.038 0.015 0.006 0.004 42.47 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from individual-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System (FARS) for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  
Accidents that occurred in counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Appendix Table A9. The ACA and the Circumstances of MVCs  
  Died due to 
Collision with 
Another 
Automobile 
Died due to 
Collision with 
Stationary 
Object 
Police 
Suspected 
Individual of 
Drug Use 
Driver of 
Automobile 
was Legally 
Drunk 
Post x Uninsured  -0.082 0.008 -0.014 -0.069 
 (0.105) (0.065) (0.056) (0.081) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  0.053 0.028 -0.044 -0.021 
 (0.167) (0.149) (0.092) (0.249) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion -0.015 0.001 -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) 
Medicaid expansion  -0.009 0.005 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.017) (0.045) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) -0.005 0.006 -0.010 -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.013) (0.042) 
  
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations  158,883 158,883 165,775 165,775 
Mean of dependent variable  0.456 0.298 0.061 0.312 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from individual-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that occurred in 
counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Appendix Table A9 (continued). The ACA and the Circumstances of MVCs  
   
 
 
Automobile was 
under 1 Year Old 
 
 
Automobile 
was over 5 
Years Old 
 
 
Automobile 
was over 10 
Years Old 
Deceased 
was wearing 
both Lap and 
Shoulder 
Seatbelt 
Post x Uninsured  -0.018 0.080 0.152 0.081 
 (0.037) (0.091) (0.113) (0.092) 
Post x Uninsured x Medicaid expansion  0.061 -0.094 -0.329 0.232 
 (0.053) (0.137) (0.244) (0.209) 
  
Implied effects at mean pre-treatment uninsured rate: 
ACA w/o Medicaid expansion -0.003 0.014 -0.027 0.015 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) 
Medicaid expansion  0.012 -0.017 -0.059 0.042 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.044) (0.038) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) 0.008 -0.003 -0.032 0.056 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.039) (0.034) 
  
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations  165,775 165,775 165,775 153,445 
Mean of dependent variable  0.028 0.821 0.534 0.391 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 
Notes: OLS estimates from individual-level regressions are shown.  Data are from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
for the period 2010-2015.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.  Accidents that occurred in 
counties with a population of less than 10,000 are excluded from the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
